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Abstract
The status of the body figures paradoxically in the interrelated
discourses of whiteness, aesthetic taste, and hipness. While
Richard Dyer’s analysis of whiteness argues that white identity
is “in but not of the body,” Carolyn Korsmeyer’s and Julia
Kristeva’s feminist analyses of aesthetic “taste” demonstrate
that this faculty is traditionally conceived as something “of”
but not “in” the body. While taste directly distances whiteness
from embodiment, hipness negatively affirms this same
distance: the hipster proves his elite status within white
culture by positioning himself as, in the words of James
Chance’s song title, “Almost Black.” The notion of hip
contributes to my analysis of taste by focusing on both the
gender politics of white embodiment, and how, by taking the
social body as object of the prepositions “in” and “of,” these
discourses of taste and hipness produce individual bodies as
white, and maintain Whiteness as a socio-political norm.
Key Words
aesthetics, body, Dyer, feminist, hipness, James Chance,
Korsmeyer, Kristeva, popular music, race, taste, whiteness
1. Introduction
The status of the body figures paradoxically in both discourses
of whiteness and of aesthetic taste. While Richard Dyer’s
analysis of whiteness argues that white identity is “in but not
of the body,” [1] feminist analyses of aesthetic “taste”
demonstrate that this faculty is traditionally conceived of as
something “of” but not “in” the body. To be “of” (or not “of”) a
body is an ontological claim, an assertion of origin or
provenance: to be “of” a body is to have a corporeal origin. To
be “in” (or not “in”) a body is a claim about location with
respect to the body, an assertion of a body’s proper attributes:
to be “in” a body is to be a part of it, contained in it,
incorporated by it. Accordingly, white identity is something
contained in, but not original to, the white body, whereas
aesthetic taste is something originally corporeal that now
operates outside the body (i.e., in the intellect). To claim that
white identity and aesthetic taste are “in but not of” or “of but
not” in the body, respectively, is to say that they both
corporeal and not corporeal, embodied and not embodied. It is
my contention that the hegemonic function of both whiteness
and taste is reinforced by this apparently paradoxical, but in
effect politically flexible and powerful notion of embodiment.
Indeed, “taste” becomes one of the most significant yet
invisible components of white privilege precisely because it
enables normative whiteness to act on and through bodies via
notions of pleasure and disgust.
While the paradoxical relationship between whiteness, taste,
and embodiment is centuries in the making, “hipness” is one
of the most overt and widespread contemporary
manifestations of this in-but-not-of/of-but-not-in logic. “Hip”
is the performance of stereotypical black male embodiment by
whites: it is something supposedly “of” black bodies, but not
“in” them; it is “in” white bodies but not “of” them. Moreover,
the hipster attempts to situate himself as “of” but not “in”
mainstream white culture. If taste is a necessarily
unsuccessful attempt to decorporealize white identity, hipness
is the necessarily unsuccessful attempt to excorporate a
specific group of elite whites from white culture. That is to say,
hipness disavows “whiteness” in order to more fully confirm
the hipster’s white privilege. No-Wave saxophonist James
Chance’s “Almost Black, pt. 1” illustrates precisely this, i.e.,
that the hipster’s apparently racially ambiguous body is, in the
end, only desirable when it reaffirms his whiteness. Thinking
hipness together with taste demonstrates how the in/of logic
of white embodiment works on the social body through its
work on individual bodies. Moreover, comparing taste’s
“decorporealization” of white identity with hipness’s
“excorporation” of elite whites from mainstream white culture
shows that, while taste and hipness attempt to achieve very
different ends, they employ a generally similar method in so
doing, i.e., this paradoxical logic of embodiment.
2. Dyer: Whiteness
Paradox abounds in Dyer’s analysis of various aspects of
whiteness, white identity, and white privilege. Indeed, paradox
may be the most consistent thread running through his
different approaches to and objects of analysis. [2] First and
foremost, whiteness maintains its privileged (i.e., normative)
position via its “invisibility,” which is in turn achieved,
paradoxically, of course, because of its omnipresence: the
invisibility of whiteness as a racial position in white (which is
to say dominant) discourse is of a piece with its ubiquity.” [3]
Since it is everywhere, whiteness “appears” to disappear, to
be nowhere, because we are, in effect, desensitized to it, just
like one becomes accustomed to a particular smell or to the
sound of a passing train. We “see” it all the time, so we cease
to recognize it as such; thus, whiteness is “invisible.” In a
society where power functions through visibility and
surveillance, the position of the “unseen seer” is one of
particular privilege. [4] Thus, while white people “are seen, we
do not (and could not possibly) actually inhabit the realm of
the unseen, observing subject without properties.” [5] In order
to maintain the illusion of “featurelessness” and “invisibility,”
whiteness is conceptualized as “unmarked, unspecific,
universal” (ibid.), i.e., the absence of properties. Since
whiteness is viewed as a non-property, as nothing in
particular, and thus as normal, “white identity” becomes key
to “the attainment of a position of disinterest – abstraction,
distance, separation, objectivity – which creates a public
sphere that is the mark of civilization.” [6] This
disinterestedness is, as I discuss later, key to the functioning
of aesthetic taste, particularly in those theories (such as
Kant’s) wherein it functions precisely as the means to or
foundation of a common, public, political space. What is
particularly noteworthy in the context of this paper is that the
false universalization of whiteness/white identity which
grounds its normative force is made possible, in part, by its
quite specific character of appearing as “in” but not “of” the
body, present by virtue of its absence.
“Whiteness,” explains Dyer, “is the sign that makes white
people visible as white, while simultaneously signifying the
character of white people, which is invisible.” [7] Described in
this way, paradox seems central to the functioning and
significance of whiteness, for, in Dyer’s analysis, “white” marks
white people as unmarked, posits a contentless content, brings
“non-existence” into existence, and renders “invisibility”
visible. Although its normative status is achieved in terms of
its relative invisibility and non-presence, white identity must
be perceptible to others: to enjoy the privileges of whiteness,
one must display the markers whereby one is recognized as
such. Thus, the visible indices of white identity cannot
themselves contain the “essence” of whiteness: “[t]o be seen
as white,” Dyer explains, “is to have one’s corporeality
registered, yet true whiteness resides in the non-corporeal.”
[8] While white privilege requires that white identity be read
“in” the body, genuine whiteness is not viewed to be “of” the
body. Because the purest whiteness must not be contaminated
by the corporeal, white women and poor/working-class whites
– who are more strongly associated with both the body and
with physical labor (both productive and reproductive) – can
be read as less “white” than bourgeois males.
This sort of disembodied subjectivity, a non-present presence,
is echoed in Dyer’s analysis of the status of white as a hue. In
color theory, white is the absence of color, yet practically this
presents difficulties: “white may not be a colour, yet in
practice it is difficult to treat it as if it is not one,” [9] for there
are various tones and shades of “white”, and “white” is
obviously something different from “clear” (which might be
more correctly the “absence” of color). Moreover, “there is a
further paradox to all this, in that standard school science
teaches that white is made of all colours fused together: white
is no colour because it is all colours.” [10] The paradoxes of
white-as-hue are parallel to those operative in discourses of
whiteness-as-identity: whiteness is nothing because it is
everything, while in the same moment its very existence is
grounded in non-existence. Accordingly, Dyer explains that
“the slippage between white as a color and white as
colorlessness forms part of a system of thought and affect
whereby white people are both particular and nothing in
particular, are both something and non-existent.” [11] As
“nothing in particular,” whiteness is thus normal, average,
common; however, as whiteness is itself something quite
particular, it is precisely the opposite of a universal or
commonality. Later in the paper I will discuss the role of this
individual-universal dynamic in conceptualizations of aesthetic
taste (which, in my mind, functions beyond or in addition to
the sort of false universalism at work in theories of
disinterestedness); for now what is important is that, like
aesthetic taste, which abstracts from intimate bodily
experiences to ideal social norms, whiteness transposes a
specific sort of embodiment into cognitive and political ideals.
3. Korsmeyer and Kristeva on Taste
While Dyer posits that whiteness is “in” but not “of” the body,
something “that is realized in and yet is not reducible to the
corporeal,” [12] Carolyn Korsmeyer and Julia Kristeva’s
various feminist reassessments of traditional Western
discourses of aesthetic taste demonstrate that it is usually
conceived of as something paradoxically “of” but not “in” the
body, i.e., as something that begins in/from the body but
exceeds and transcends its corporeal underpinnings, and is
thereby most properly realized in non-corporeal domains
(cognition, politics, etc.).
Korsmeyer observes that gustatory taste includes in both its
experience and its conceptualization all the key aspects
philosophers sought in/from aesthetic taste: immediate,
intimate pleasure or displeasure, and notions of refinement
and education, to name a few. Identifying as “paradoxical” the
fact that gustatory taste “provides the language, indeed the
conceptual framework,” [13] for aesthetic taste, while the
actual sense faculty of tasting and the savoring of food is
excluded from the purview genuine aesthetic appreciation,
Korsmeyer argues that Western philosophy’s anxieties about
femininity and embodiment necessitate the disavowal of
aesthetic theory’s reliance on the experience of eating and
drinking. [14] Gustatory taste, as the subjective experience of
one’s intimate bodily sensations, concerns itself with
perishable, transient goods and pleasures, with utility (one
must eat to survive), with the private and domestic, and with
material objects – all things stereotypically associated with
women and non-whites.
Indeed, as Korsmeyer and others have argued, early theorists
of aesthetic taste were motivated to distinguish a properly
refined bourgeois masculine pleasure in art from unrestrained,
corporeal pleasure in sex. In so doing, gustatory taste
functions as the ground against which aesthetic taste – which
is supposed to be universal, disinterested, and concerned with
art only for art’s sake – is defined. [15] Thus, if gustatory
taste is the key model for thinking about aesthetic taste, we
see that aesthetic taste is grounded in bodily sensation, and in
this sense “of” the body; however, insofar as traditional
discourses of aesthetic taste seek to remove “taste” from the
intimacy of the body and transplant it into the intellect and the
public sphere, aesthetic taste is not located “in” the body but
in the mind. Hence, for example, Kant claims that the
experience of the sublime elicits pleasure by prompting one to
reflect on one’s intellectual capacities and not, notably, on
nature or art. Aesthetic taste is something intellectual and
public modeled after something that is corporeal and intimate
– it is “of” but not “in” the body.
This paradoxical status is, to extend Korsmeyer’s argument,
necessary if the concept of aesthetic taste is to accomplish
what its eighteenth- and nineteenth-century theorists
designed it to do, i.e., serve as the basis for a subjective
universal or sensus communis. Indeed, what Korsmeyer labels
“the so-called problem of taste”, namely, “how to acknowledge
the subjectivity of taste yet retain a foundation for standards
of taste when discussing art” [16] is strikingly similar to what
Dyer identifies as the paradox of whiteness, i.e., its status as
“universal” or normative arises from its status as a highly
specific and highly privileged category; that is to say,
whiteness, like aesthetic taste, is a “subjective universal.” It is
because they have this status, i.e., as norm and, because
privileged, as applying to “everyone,” yet/because only to a
strictly limited group, [17] that whiteness and aesthetic taste
exhibit this paradoxical logic of dis/embodiment. Indeed, as
scholarship has shown, the very norms falsely universalized by
aesthetic taste were patriarchal, European, bourgeois,
heteronormative ones. [18]
Kristeva’s more psychoanalytically and phenomenologically
oriented account of aesthetic taste examines the paradoxical
dynamic of embodiment in greater depth. While Korsmeyer
offers a feminist critique of traditional discourses of aesthetic
taste, Kristeva’s project is more of a re-working thereof.
Kristeva describes taste as a stage where the intimate and the
public confront one another in ways which transform both.
Rather than disavowing or rejecting the individual, subjective,
and intimate, Kristeva’s notion of taste seeks to describe the
interactions which blur the border(s) between individual and
society, particular and universal. It is precisely taste which
bridges intimate and public life, thus making each possible:
“The most intimate of the perceptions, and one that mobilizes
an orality and a sense of smell that are far more internal than
are the other senses (sight, hearing, and touch), taste
nevertheless possesses the capacity to be shared.” [19]
Gustatory and olfactory senses function via the incorporation
of external objects into the perceiving subject; at the same
time, argues Kristeva, these senses situate bodily and psychic
interiority in discourse and (re)cognizable experience.
Politics is possible, according to Kristeva, because a common –
if not always consciously thematized – discourse works on and
through bodies, rendering them speaking, sensing, and
thinking subjects. The body politic, the arena of free action,
intellectual inquiry, civilization and culture is possible precisely
because it is also a sphere of intimate bodily sensation. [20]
Indeed, Kristeva’s purpose here is to question the boundaries
between “public” and “private”, intellect and body. Taste or
“common sense” (i.e., sensus communis) is so
effective/affective because “it is the ‘effect of a reflection upon
the mind’” which “affects me as a sensation would.” [21] A
socially constructed and shared discourse, taste subjectivizes
(in Judith Butler’s sense) the body, and is the locus where the
social becomes material, and the intimate appears as such by
virtue of its social mediation. Kristeva explains that, according
to Arendt,
‘the it-pleases-or-displeases-me, which as a
feeling seems so utterly private and non-
communicative, is actually rooted in this
community sense and is therefore open to
communication once it has been transformed by
reflection, which takes all others and their
feelings into account.’ Put another way, when we
taste or judge, we judge in our role as a ‘member
of a community.’ [22]
Intimate and shared, bodily and discursive, Kristeva’s notion of
taste maintains a paradoxical, if deconstructed, relationship to
embodiment. Even though she renders ambiguous any strict
distinctions between material and intellectual, individual and
social, Kristeva nevertheless posits taste as something that is
something both “in” and “not in”, “of” but “not of” the body.
While political life and the life of the mind incorporate intimate
bodily sensation, this sensation is never fully “in” nor “of” the
body: “an always already socialized sensation,” [23] Unlike
traditional formulations, Kristeva’s deconstructed notion of
taste does not disavow the role of embodiment in “common
sense,” but it does not for that fact re-conceive or re-situate
taste’s non-embodied embodiment (of but not in) or embodied
non-embodiment (in but not of.
Both whiteness and taste are “always already socialized
sensation[s]” [24] which, in conjunction with gender,
sexuality, class, and ability, function to differentially situate
bodies with respect to the body politic. Just as the “common
sense” of taste indicates that “we belong from the outset to a
community that requires neither understanding or moral
imperatives to create itself but that nevertheless operates out
of an always already socialized sensation,” [25] whiteness
operates as a grouping whose membership is determined by
neither cognitive nor moral criteria, but through “an always
already socialized sensation,” a training of the body, a specific
means of relating to the body in which learned behaviors are
experienced as “my true inner self,” or as a “gut reaction.”
[26] Kristeva acknowledges that “taste, which cannot be
translated into words, is impossible to memorize, and is
instantaneous and irresistible.” [27] Just as one cannot
develop a gustatory palate by reading a book, “common
sense” is a sort of savoir-faire acquired as the body is
socialized and subjectivized. Because taste appears to be
internal, private, and not socially-mediated, it can be
understood as or felt to be irrefutable: chacun à son gout.
Moreover, it seems to be the natural consequence or feature
of a particular type of embodiment, just as childbearing
appears to be the natural consequence of female embodiment,
or that predispositions to certain diseases are considered to be
the natural consequence of certain genetic configurations.
The effect of this, then, is that it naturalizes socio-political
relations constructing individual bodies in accordance with the
prerequisites of the body politic. Thus, in the context of white
privilege and normative whiteness, these social structures will
be reproduced in and reinforced by dominant constructions of
white embodiment. Angela Davis’s discussion of the “racially
segregationist distribution strategy” applied to mid-twentieth-
century American popular music illustrates quite clearly the
normative advantages derived from the confluence of
whiteness and taste around a particularly paradoxical mode of
embodiment. Arguing that the distinction between “race”
music and implicitly “normal” or universal but in fact “white”
music “implicitly instructed white ears to feel revolted by the
blues and, moreover, to assume that this sense of revulsion
was instinctive,” Davis shows how white privilege locates itself
as something simultaneously “in” but not “of” the body (as the
“feeling” of social privilege) and “of” but not “in” it (as taste).
Part of the “natural” experience of whiteness was to feel (in
and with the body, but an always socially-mediated body) that
non-whiteness (a social category, but one that is about and
operates on bodies) was disgusting, i.e., dis-tasteful. It is my
argument that whiteness and taste function together so
powerfully because they are symmetrically and
complimentarily paradoxical in their embodiment: whiteness is
“in but not of”, and taste is “of but not in” the body. In but not
in, of but not of, both whiteness and taste function
normatively because they are everywhere but nowhere,
universal but intimate.
4. From Taste to Hip(ness)
This paradoxical logic of racialized embodiment evinces itself
not only in the traditional, high-culture discourse of taste but
also in more contemporary and pop-culture deployments of
“hip.” While, historically, “hip” and “taste” are very different in
some important respects, at a more abstract, structural level
they have much in common, particularly with respect to
whiteness, differential privilege among whites, and white
masculine embodiment. Both concepts indicate a certain form
of refined discernment, either a savoir-faire or a learned
judgment, the practice of which accords one special social
status apart from various brands of “uneducated” or “clueless”
masses. While taste arose as part of the consolidation of the
white European bourgeois patriarchy, hipness emerged as a
means for a certain elite portion of the white bourgeois
patriarchy to affirm its privilege by rejecting what had
become, by the twentieth century, feminized mainstream white
bourgeois culture. [29] Picking up on “‘an American tradition
of class abdication through gendered cross-racial emersion’”
[30] hipness is the inversion of taste: taste was meant to
confirm class aspiration; hip is class abdication – both,
however, function to assert and reaffirm white masculine
privilege. Indeed, if taste asserts white masculinity insofar as
it is defined against sexual desire and gustatory pleasure, then
hipness affirms white masculinity in an approbation of a
specific sort of sexual desire and sensory pleasure (i.e., an
appropriately masculine one).
In the West, “hipness,” i.e., the all-too-knowing, rebellious,
and avant-garde rejection of bourgeois values (both by avant-
garde scenesters and suburban kids trying to annoy their
parents), is usually figured as something “of” black male
bodies but of necessity not “in” them; alternately, it is
something sort of “in” or “on” white bodies, but decidedly not
“of” them. If “taste” expresses bourgeois white patriarchy’s
desire to appropriate and subjectivize white bodies with
techniques and practices which appear to sever ties to
embodiment, then “hipness” expresses the desire of a certain
elite portion of the bourgeois white patriarchy to claim for itself
a superior relationship to both the “real world” and “culture”
with techniques and practices which appear to sever ties to
the white bourgeois patriarchy. That is to say, insofar as taste
is a white disavowal of embodiment which can never actually
reject the body, hipness is the appropriation of the very
embodiment disavowed by taste in order to then disavow
whiteness and taste in ways which continue to call upon the
structures and content hipness supposedly rejects. In the
same way in which whiteness ultimately needs bodies to be
read as white, hipness ultimately needs the values of the white
bourgeois patriarchy in order to ground its cultural and
political claims. In order to more fully conform to white
bourgeois patriarchal ideals, hipsters attempt to disassociate
themselves with the very white bourgeois patriarchy that
underwrites the privilege accorded to this sort of innovative
rebel. “Hipsters”, in their claims to alienation from white
bourgeois patriarchy, are really only attempting to one-up the
white bourgeois patriarchy at its own game (by being more
macho, more white). Hip’s location within the white bourgeois
patriarchy becomes clear when its deployments, both
contemporary and historical, are examined in terms of this
paradoxical logic of racialized embodiment exhibited by the
related concept of taste.
5. Embodied Quintessence
Looking to Ingrid Monson’s analysis of the gendered and
racialized dynamics of “hip” in the U.S., at least two different
layers of hipness’s paradoxical relationship to and deployment
of embodiment become evident: first, “hipness” is something
both ideal and material, “quintessence” and sheer physicality;
second, the trappings of hipness are valued when they are
viewed as “of” black male bodies but not when seen “in” them,
while at the same time these trappings are valued when read
in or on white bodies as something precisely not of them.
Throughout the history of its deployment in the U.S., “hip,”
argues Monson, is “quintessentially defined by and expressed
in the sartorial display and bearing of black men.” For various
reasons, black men were seen to have more “authentic”
relationships to their bodies and hence their gender and
sexuality and, accordingly, occupy a position outside of or in
resistance to dominant white bourgeois culture. [32] In the
mid-to-late twentieth century, Western culture itself was
considered (from a normatively white, masculine position) to
be overdetermined by capitalist relations of production and
commodificaiton, and thus assumed to be irreparably
alienating and passivizing, i.e., feminizing. When all activities,
economic, cultural, and whatever, seem inevitably alienating,
then the subject is faced with a seemingly inescapable loss of
control, agency, and ownership of both his body and his
intellect. Participation in cultural institutions and dominant
cultural discourses was no longer a sign of one’s refined
judgment (i.e., taste), but precisely the opposite, of one’s
inability to make one’s own choices. That is to say, the subject
lost the privileges accorded to masculinity in a patriarchal
society. Coupled with already-existent stereotypes about the
hypersexualized African-American body, African-Americans’
marginalization in/exclusion from post-industrial
bureaucratized capitalism leads to the mythologization of poor,
rural African-American men as more genuinely masculine than
those men who participate in feminized dominant (white)
culture. [33]
Thus, so the story goes, in adopting the visible bodily styles of
black men, one also adopts their “outsider” status. From their
often incomplete perceptions of a specifically stylized
performance of black male embodiment, white hipsters
abstract various modes of speech, comportment, dress,
behavior, and thought. Thus, to go back to Monson’s claim,
the definitive metaphysics of hipness – its quintessence, its
very being – consists in stereotypes about the embodied styles
of black men. What is at issue here is not how actual black
men carry themselves but white stereotypes about how they
do. In “hip”, then, we have something that is not genuinely
“of” anyone’s body but that gains its cultural cache via the
fetishistic disavowal of this fact: hipness is desirable because it
is understood to be “of” black male bodies since, in order to
maintain its supposedly oppositional status, hip must not be
seen to be “of” white bodies or white culture generally. This is
so because, (1) as Dyer argues, whites aren’t really supposed
to have bodies, and (2), if it must be admitted that whites do
have bodies, their phenomenological and political status as
white bodies implies that they are too thoroughly assimilated
to dominant norms to be adequately “rebellious” or
“masculine” bodies. Thus, in order to accede to the privileged
position of “‘anti-assimilationist’ social critic,” [34] whites
perform “hip” in a way that manifests something in but not of
their body; at the same time, this hipness is supposedly “of” a
body which it is not at that moment “in.”
Just as “taste” is a disavowal of whites’ relation to their
bodies, “hip” is also a white disavowal of white embodiment,
this time mediated by white constructions of black masculinity.
Hip attempts to legitimate, in white male bodies, certain
modes of physicality and sensory pleasure as “appropriately”
white, heterosexual, and masculine. Unlike taste, which is
grounded in the abjection of physicality, hipness is an attempt
to recoup a supposedly “authentic” relationship to embodiment
and agency which mainstream culture renders otherwise
inaccessible to the not-quite-privileged-enough masses. The
white masculine performance of hipness is not an immediate
immersion in physicality so much as a demonstration of one’s
ability to engage corporeality without thereby falling into a
sort of feminized passive immanence.
If, as I have tried to show, “hip” is something that is “in but
not of” the body because it is at the same time “of but not in”
the Other’s body, “hip” can be seen as the properly white and
masculine subject’s overcoming of the threats of both
postindustrial alienation from the body, and of non-white
racialized immersion in the body and its concordant alienation
from postindustrial society. Like Ulysses, who was able to
overcome the dangers of his forays into exotic lands (and
women) and return safely home, the hip individual’s
engagement with “outsider” culture is always undertaken for
the purpose of demonstrating one’s ability to conquer or
domesticate what would otherwise threaten or void one’s
privilege. What is on display, in the end, is virility, idealized
white hetero male sexuality. As with Dyer’s analysis of
tanning, where he argues that whites’ display of dark/non-
“white” skin only further affirms their racial privilege by
demonstrating that whites can adopt the physical features of
non-whites yet nonetheless expect and exercise the privilege
which is denied to non-whites precisely on the basis of this
physical feature, I argue that hipness is in no way a rejection
of the white bourgeois patriarchy, but indeed an affirmation of
it, of white male bodies as inherently strong, powerful, virile.
[35]
6. “He’s Almost Black…”
Simultaneously read as white but not-quite white, non-white
but not quite non-white, hipsters “embody” non-white
corporeal styles for the express purpose of asserting their
white, masculine, bourgeois privilege. Hip’s location as both
“in-but-not-of” and “of-but-not-in” facilitates this apparently
ambiguous racial identification, just as ambiguous racial
identification is key to the logic and performance of hip. The
ambiguous racial identification upon which “hip” turns is borne
out in James Chance’s song “Almost Black pt. 1.” [36] Moving
from the mid-1970s New York free jazz scene into the No
Wave scene which he and his band The Contortions came to
define, Chance consistently problematized the racial politics of
then-contemporary American popular music. After leaving The
Contortions, Chance fronted a new band modeled explicitly
after the JBs and, accordingly, adopted the new stage name
James White (a name which directly contrasts him to the
leader of the JBs, James Brown). Later, this same act came to
be known as James White and the Blacks. Appearing on James
White and the Blacks’s 1979 album “Off White,” “Almost Black
(pt. 1)” addresses the aesthetically and socio-politically
privileged position of the white hipster who gains his authority
by appearing, as it were, “almost black” but, for that very fact,
in the end is all-the-more white. Significantly, the racial status
of the “he” under question in the song (implicitly “he” is
Chance) turns on his sexuality/sexual performance as a
heterosexual male.
Chance’s racial ambiguity is borne out in both the lyrics and
the formal structure of the song. There are two main parts to
the song: the first half contains vocals sung by two females,
one presumptively white, the other presumptively black; the
second half replaces the female vocalists with Chance’s noise-
improv alto sax. Initially, the lyrics are delivered in a spoken-
word style by alternating white and black female vocalists:
first, the white woman posits evidence of Chance’s blackness,
while the black woman argues that he is not; then, the black
woman puts forth evidence as to Chance’s whiteness, and the
white woman argues to the contrary. Finally, in the last verse
(Verse 3 in the chart below), the black voice drops out entirely
and the white woman claims that her strong sexual desire for
him arises from the fact that he is not quite white, and not
entirely black either. While any stereotypically black
characteristics he attempts to adopt are somehow awkward
(e.g., slapping five), when it comes to sexual prowess, his
potential blackness is not questioned. However, it is key that
this “potential blackness” is at the same time what makes him
“almost white.” The white female voice finds him attractive
and sexually potent because he “might be white” but is yet
“almost black.” [37] That is to say, he is thought to be “almost
black” because he excels in hetero masculine sexual
performance; he is still strongly desirable to white women
because his exhibition of stereotypically black male
hypersexuality is softened/domesticated by his ultimate
whiteness – while hypersexuality is supposedly “dangerous” in
black men, it is exceptionally desirable in white men. While
Chance might be almost black, he is, in the end, necessarily
white; this racial ambiguity can function as an asset only
because these stereotypical features “of” black male bodies
appear “in” a white man’s body.
This reconsolidation of racial ambiguity is evinced more clearly
in the musical form of the song. While the verses are internally
and comparatively indeterminate in formal structure, the 12-
bar intro/exit theme begins and ends the song in very
unambiguous terms. Below you will find a chart illustrating the
structures I am speaking about here. The two halves of the
song are easily distinguished by melodic voice: the first half
contains the female vocalists, the second half, Chance’s sax
improv. The first half is ten 4-bar phrases long, parsed in a
4+3+3 pattern based on the alternation of vocal roles; the
second half is also ten 4-bar phrases long, but it can be
parsed in two ways: either two equal parts (5+5), or two
unequal parts (7+3). While the latter interpretation more
closely mirrors the structure of the first half, it might be more
in keeping with the song’s tendency to play with formal
indeterminacy and asymmetry to contrast the first half with an
evenly-split second half (so the song would be
3+4+3+3+1+5+5+3). What is key is that there is this foray
into 5 groupings, which seem out of context with the patterns
established in the first part of the song. However, the 5-
groupings lead into another 3-grouping; difference is
consolidated, narrative closure is achieved. Chance can be
“almost black” because he is, in the end, clearly very white.
Measures Formal
function
Lyrics
4 intro
4 Intro
motive +
guitar
4 Guitar +
sax
4 Verse 1 "(w) Well, he's almost
black..."
(b)...That nig-gah's white.
4 Verse 1 "Well, he's got some
moves..."
...But they ain't right.
4 Verse 1 He slapped me five
That five is jive
He don't talk
4 Verse 1 trash
4 He don't do shit
4 Verse 2 (b) He don't have roots
(w) Well he's proud of it
4 Verse 2 He's got some sass
He's gotta right
4 Verse 2 "He's got no soul, girl"
...mmm...
4 Verse 3 "(w only from here out)
...but then, he might..."
He makes me feel
Hightened...
4 Verse 3 ...all night
I love 'im cause he might be
white
4 Verse 3 But every time I feel
that smack
I want 'im more cause he's...
4 ...almost black...
4 Sax
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4 Intro :II
4 Intro
motive +
guitar
4 guitar +
fade out
“Almost Black” (pt. 1) demonstrates on many levels that
Chance’s “hipness” arises from his ability to be read as
somehow not completely included within whiteness/white
bourgeois patriarchy. Even the genre of the track is a little too
funky to be (white) noise/post-punk, but too awkward and
noisy in its funkyness to be (black) funk or disco. However, by
excluding himself from whiteness, Chance only further
embodies white European culture’s ideal of the rebel-outsider-
hip-genius. Hipness might very well be understood as the
ability to ride this very ambiguous line between insider and
outsider, to use one’s appearance as an outsider as a means
to secure one’s “insider” status as part of a specific elite within
the dominant culture.
In-but-not-of/of-but-not-in is a paradoxical logic of
embodiment; it is the same sort of relationship desired in
hipness, this time to the social body. To be “hip” is to be in,
but not “of” dominant culture in the sense that a hipster
rejects various hegemonic norms while at the same time being
privileged by them. Alternately, to be “hip” is to be “of”
dominant culture but not “in” it in the sense that one might
have rather mainstream origins (e.g., white middle-class
upbringing in the Midwest) but no longer actively participate in
the culture of one’s birth. If it is the case that hipness
ultimately desires to be “in but not of”/“of but not in” the
dominant social body, then hipness can be read as a
characteristically white relation to the (white) social body. In
hipness, the individual’s quitting of the dominant social body is
achieved through a specific relation to his or her own body:
ex-corporation is both exclusion (from the body politic) and
disembodiment (a white relation to one’s own body, the desire
to ultimately not “be” a (mere) body). One excorporates
oneself from the social body by affectively situating oneself
“outside” mainstream whiteness; this in turn is achieved in the
performance of the stereotypical bodily styles of hetero black
masculinity. Hipness, like taste, accomplishes its social
function by working on/in individual bodies, their preferences,
pleasures, and displeasures.
7. Alienation: Hip as “Subjective Universal”
In the first part of the paper, I identified two ways beyond the
traditional Kantian version in which taste functions as a
“subjective universal”: first, in Kristeva’s sense as an “always
already socialized sensation;” second, as a false metonymy or
overgeneralization. Since, as I have just argued, hipness uses
bodily affect to situate the individual with respect to the social
body, both of these functions of taste’s “subjective
universality” can also be found in hipness. My “gut feelings”
aren’t entirely “mine”, for I must be socialized to recognize
them as meaningful in the first place. While I have already
discussed some of the ways in which, as “always already
socialized sensation”, my “gut feelings” and perceived affect
are “in” but not entirely “of” my body, I now want to turn
attention to the other aspect of hip’s relation to “subjective
universality.” In hipness, what Dyer identifies as the false
universalization of whiteness gets turned on its head: while
whiteness posits white experience as the normative “human
condition,” hipness attempts to “universalize” the alienation of
African-American men, making it generalizable by ignoring or
disavowing the concrete specificities of that alienation by virtue
of which black men and white hipsters are differentially
privileged.
Hipness is a sort of generalized alienation abstracted from the
literal alien status of black men in the West [38]. When this
sort of rebellious marginality appears in privileged (i.e., white)
bodies, it is socially desirable; however, when it appears in
non-privileged (i.e., non-white) bodies, it is seen as a threat
to society at large. Constructed in accordance with this double
standard, “hipness” mirrors the logic of marginalization<-- --
>appropriation which feminist aestheticians have diagnosed as
common to most Western conceptualizations of genius. [39]
Patriarchy posits femininity as emotional, irrational, and
intuitive. When these traits are found in women, they are
given as evidence for women’s exclusion from achievement;
however, when they appear in privileged male bodies, these
traits, when tempered with properly masculine reason,
moderation, and education, are signs of exceptional intellect
and creativity.
Similarly, my analysis of hipness demonstrates that (what
whites perceive to be) black male alienation is acceptable to
dominant culture when it appears in white bodies but
“dangerous” and undomesticated when it appears in non-white
bodies. From Birth of A Nation to Cam’ron and “Stop
Snitching”, mainstream white culture stereotypes alienated
black men as threats to the social order; thus, black male
alienation is undesirable when it appears in black male bodies
but has incredible cache when it appears in white male bodies
because, supposedly, white men are able to overcome and
neutralize the “dangers” posed by excorporation from the
social body (because, perhaps, they’re never really “outside”?
). Indeed, in his analysis of white masculinity, Dyer argues
that, with regard to the idealized white male, “darkness is a
sign of his true masculinity, just as his ability to control it is a
sign of his whiteness.” [40] It is never necessary to exclude
the hip white dude from white culture because ultimately he is
able to overcome the dangers lurking in masculinity; indeed,
masculinity evinces its “perfection” in the ability to master the
strength, aggression, and virility required of it.
This analysis of hipness shows how the in/of logic of whiteness
works on the social body not only in addition to, but through
its work on individual bodies. Although taste, through the
notion of the sensus communis, addresses the relationship
between individual judgment and shared standards, hipness
attenuates and focuses on the paradoxical status of the
individual’s location out/inside of the social body. While taste
has, from the start, been a mechanism for (re)enforcing group
boundaries and membership, it does not necessarily do so in
terms of the in-but-not-of/of-but-not-in logic discussed in this
paper. Hipness, however, does precisely this: in the economy
of hipness, gendered and raced corporeal styles ex-corporate
one from the dominant social body in a fashion which only
further confirms one’s status as an elite insider. Put differently,
hipness exhibits in relation to the social body the white logic of
embodiment which, in the case of taste, is applied to the
individual body.
Finally, this analysis of taste/hipness shows that the
conceptual tools of aesthetics are a necessary component in
analyzing the politics of embodiment. Political change requires
change in the ways individuals experience their own bodies,
bodily habits, routines, and preferences, and their body’s
normative/preferable relationship to the social body. Political
change involves changing the ways in which we experience our
bodies, our pleasures and our dislikes. It involves changing
habits, encountering new experiences, expanding and/or
refining our palette of experiences. In examining white
embodiment at both the individual and social levels, my
discussion of taste and hipness shows not only how Western
aesthetics trains us all to have normatively white bodies; it
also articulates a baseline from which change must depart.
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